






An Encounter between 
Philosophy and Modern Psychotherapy
Abstract
The article attempts to uncover a forgotten perspective on healing the human soul – one 
that does not fall under the history of medicine but rather the history of philosophy, thus 
emphasising the connection between philosophy and modern psychotherapy. This neces-
sitates an examination of the relationship between modern psychotherapy and modern psy-
chology/psychiatry. It follows that psychotherapy is not significantly defined by knowledge 
particular to either psychology or psychiatry, even though psychotherapy does encompass 
procedures grounded in the scientific and theoretical bases of psychology. In conclusion, it 
is proven that it is not knowledge in the modern sense that acts as a determinant for psycho-
therapy, but rather a kind of compassion that is characteristic of the philosopher.
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Psychotherapy	today	is	most	often	perceived	as	the	art	of	ameliorating	mental	
disturbances,	and	it	is	considered	to	fall	within	the	bounds	of	clinical	psychol-













sion”	 project,	 which	 was	 carried	 out	 at	 the	







M. Lohr	(ed.),	Science and Pseudoscience in





































on	healing	 the	human	soul	–	one	 that	 falls	under	 the	history	of	philosophy	
instead	of	the	history	of	medicine.
I.
While	 the	name	 ‘psychotherapy’	was	used	nearly	 synonymously	with	psy-
choanalysis	in	the	early	20th	century,	many	of	the	psychotherapeutic	trends	
that	 developed	 after	 the	 1950s	 distanced	 themselves	 from	 psychoanalysis.	
It	can	be	said	that	scientific	psychotherapy	developed	into	three	basic	divi-
sions:	(1)	psychoanalytical	therapy,	(2)	humanistic	therapy,	and	(3)	cognitive	





















of	 reality	 as	 “humanistic	 imagination”.	 Cf.	
Richard	D.	Chessick,	Why Psychotherapists 




International Statistical Classification of Dis-
eases and Related Health Problems (ICD).	
The	 World	 Psychiatric	 Association	 cooper-
ates	 with	 the	 World	 Health	 Organisation	 in	
editing	the	chapter	on	mental	and	behavioural	
disorders.	The	American	Psychiatric	Associa-
tion	publishes	 the	Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders	(DSM).
4
The	 existentialist/humanist	 approach	 neces-
sarily	implies	the	ontological	issue	of	the	na-
ture	of	man.	Cf.	Rollo	May,	Psychology and 
the Human Dilemma,	 Van	 Nostrand,	 Princ-
eton	1967,	p.	92.
5
Today,	 ever	 greater	 efforts	 are	 underway	
within	the	scientific	community	to	build	and	
strengthen	 the	 relationship	between	philoso-
phy	 and	 psychotherapy.	 Many	 prestigious	
universities	have	founded	master	programmes	
in	philosophy	and	mental	health,	which	also	
includes	 scientific	work	 focused	on	areas	 in	
which	 philosophy	 and	 psychotherapy	 over-
lap.	 These	 efforts	 have	 also	 resulted	 in	 the	
following	 books:	R.	D.	Chessick,	Why Psy-
chotherapists Fail;	 Chris	 Mace	 (ed.),	 Heart 
& Soul: The therapeutic face of philosophy,	
Routledge,	 London	 1999;	 Donald	 Robert-
son,	The philosophy of cognitive-behavioural 
therapy (CBT): Stoic philosophy as rational 




National	 Institute	 of	 Mental	 Health	 (1975),	
more	 than	250	new	branches	of	psychother-
apy	 exist	 today.	 Cf.	 Barry	L.	 Duncan,	 Mark	
A.	Hubble,	Scott	D.	Miller,	Escape from Ba-
bel. Toward a Unifying Language for Psycho-




sis	 is	 nothing	 more	 than	 the	 psychology	 of	
neuroses,	see:	Otto	Fenichel,	The Psychoana-
lytic Theory of Neurosis,	Norton,	New	York	
1945.
8
José	M.	López	Piñero,	Historical Origins of 




the	 delusional	 ideas	 (Wahnideen)	 that	 make	
up	 the	 unconscious	 mind	 –	 people	 differen-
tiate	 among	 themselves	 because	 of	 the	 dif-
ferent	content	of	these	and	similar	ideas.	Cf.	
Sigmund	 Freud,	 Gesammelte Werke – Band 
XI. Vorlesungen zur Einfuhrung in die Psy-
choanalyse,	 S.	 Fischer,	 Frankfurt	 am	 Main	
1969,	 p.	 257.	 Freud	 believes	 that	 neuroses	
can	 be	 uncovered	 by	 learning	 about	 resist-
ance	 and	 suppression,	 the	 unconscious,	 the	
etiological	 meaning	 of	 sexual	 life,	 and	 the	
significance	 of	 childhood	 experiences.	 Cf.	




Harry	 Stokholm,	 “Our	 Concept	 of	 Neuro-
sis:	 A	 Brief	 Critical	 Comment”,	 Acta Psy-
chiatrica Scandinavica	 31	 (S108/1957),	 pp.	
363–366.	doi:	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1600-
0447.1956.tb01699.x.	 If	 neurosis	 is	 defined	
















symptoms	 that	 should	 be	 treated,	 the	 philo-
sophical	viewpoint	considers	neurosis	a	vital,	
































According	 to	Plato,	all	various	and	opposing	forces	 in	 life	–	 the	desire	 for	













ing	 traumatic	 childhood	 experiences	 and	more	on	uncovering	 the	 cause	of	




































lack	of	awareness	of	 the	unitary	nature	of	 the	 soul.17	 Individuals	with	 low	
ent,	specific	disorders	that	can	fall	within	the	
clinical	picture	of	neuroses	are	only	different	
forms	 of	 an	 unauthentic	 confrontation	 with	
existential	anxiety.	Along	 these	 lines,	Tillich	
ontologically	defines	neurosis	as	“the	way	of	
avoiding	 nonbeing	 by	 avoiding	 being”.	 See:	
Paul	Tillich,	The Courage to Be,	Yale	Univer-
sity,	New	Haven	 2000,	 p.	 66.	 It	 thus	 seems	
that	the	patient,	if	he	desires	to	realise	an	au-
thentic	way	of	life,	must	learn	to	listen	to	what	
his	neurotic	anxiety	 is	 trying	 to	 tell	him.	By	












therapy	 explains	 it	 as	 an	 opposing	 division	
between	vital	 actions	 the	nature	of	which	 is	
to	 tend	 towards	 harmonious	 unification	 (so-
called	polarities).	Cognitive	behavioural	psy-
chotherapy	defines	 it	as	a	conflict	 regarding	
alternative	 courses	 of	 action.	 For	 more	 on	
cognitive	 behavioural	 therapy	 see:	Aaron	 T.	
Beck,	Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional 
Disorders,	Meridian,	Boston	1979.
12
In	 his	 autobiography	 (1924),	 Freud	 writes:	




– Band XIV,	 p.	 49.	 On	 Freud’s	 inheritance	
of	Plato’s	conception	of	 the	soul,	see:	Fabio	






According	 to	 Plato,	 the	 dynamics	 of	 disre-
garding	one	of	the	two	opposing	halves	of	the	
soul	is	a	determinant	for	the	establishment	of	
conflict	 between	 body	 and	 soul.	 According	
to	 Plato,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 healthy	 life	 if	 the	
soul	disregards	any	aspect	of	life.	Man	must	
live	for	the	benefit	of	both	body	and	soul,	as	
both	 those	who	 suppress	 the	body	 and	bod-
ily	 pleasures	 in	 favour	 of	 mental	 pleasures	









Cf.	Karen	Horney,	The Neurotic Personality 
of Our Time,	W.W.	Norton	&	Company,	New	
York	 1937;	 Karen	 Horney,	Our Inner Con-
















health”,	 International Journal of Law and 




cise	 ontological	 determinant	 of	 illness	 (De 
placitis Hippocratis at Platonis,	V,	2.39–43):	
“Disease	 is	 a	 higher	 and	 more	 general	 term	




















































It	 can	be	 said	 that	Plato’s	philosophy	claims	 that	 this	 art	 of	 living	enables	
















emotional	 states	of	 anger,	 joy,	 sadness	or	 lethargy.22	Cicero	 thus	 expressly	
notes	that	philosophers	consider	mental	illness	to	be	the	suffering	borne	by	
man	as	a	result	of	emotional	distress,	not	those	disorders	that	can	be	amel-
iorated	 through	 knowledge	 of	 the	 Hippocratic	 art	 of	 medicine	 (Tusculanes	

















nally	 diseased,	 as	 though	 their	 components,	
congenial	by	nature,	had	come	to	blows.	This	
is	 the	 most	 generic	 concept	 of	 all	 disease.	







the	original	text	in:	Galen,	On the Doctrines 
of Hippocrates and Plato,	Akademie-Verlag,	
Berlin	1978
18
It	 is	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 this	 very	 conception	
of	 mental	 illness	 that	 the	 stoics	 proclaimed	
all	 people	 are	 fools	 –	 every	 man,	 holding	
to	 disturbing	 emotions,	 is	 in	 a	 way	 men-
tally	 ill;	 only	 the	 enlightened	 wise	 man	 is	
absolved	 of	 mental	 illness.	 Cf.	 Margaret	
Graver,	 Stoicism and Emotion,	 University	
of	 Chicago	 Press,	 Chicago	 –	 London	 2007,	












corporis	 morbis	 petendum	 est	 foris,	 omni-
busque	 opibus	 viribus,	 ut	 nosmet	 ipsi	 nobis	
mederi	 possimus,	 elaborandum	 est.	 Quamq-
uam	de	universa	philosophia,	quanto	opere	et	
expetenda	esset	et	colenda,	satis,	ut	arbitror,	
dictum	 est	 in	 Hortensio.”	 According	 to	 the	
original	 text:	 Max	 Pohlenz	 (ed.),	 M. Tullius 
Cicero: Tusculanae disputationes,	 Teubner,	
Leipzig	1918.	[=	Tusculanes].
22
Tardarum passionum libri, I.	150, in:	Caelius	
Aurelianus,	 Akute Krankheiten Buch I-III. 





terpreted	 by	 Pierre	 Hadot	 and	 Marta	 Nuss-
baum.	Cf.	Pierre	Hadot,	Philosophy as a Way 
of Life – Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to 
Foucault,	Blackwell,	Oxford	1995;	Marta	C.	
Nussbaum,	The Therapy of the Desire. Theory 
and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics,	Princeton	
University	Press,	Princeton	2009.
24
Debra	 Hershkowitz,	 The Madness of Epic. 








ance	 in	 the	 body.	 Both	 in	 ancient	 and	 modern	 empiricists	 claim	 that	
there	is	no	form	of	madness	whose	cause	cannot	be	reduced	to	the	body	












opposed	 to	 the	 incurable	 type,	 the	 curable	 type	 of	 madness	 can	 be	
treated	 –	 in	 addition	 to	 medical	 treatment	 –	 by	 uncovering	 the	 na-



















try	 is	 the	belief	 that	neurotic	 symptoms	have	a	deeper	 (ontological)	 sense.	































aimed	 more	 at	 researching	 that	 which	 is	 independent	 of	 a	 particular	 indi-














that	 clinical	 psychologists	 and	 psychiatrists	
today	 completely	 accept	 only	 the	 possibil-
ity	of	empirical	descriptions	of	diseases,	and	
stubbornly	negate	the	problem	of	the	internal	
conflict	 that	 man	 suffers	 because	 of	 the	 du-
ality	 of	 body	 and	 soul:	 “In	 modern	 medical	




way	 that	 the	problem	which	 it	 raises	cannot	
be	solved,	or	suppressed,	without	some	kind	
of	 metaphysical	 considerations	 trespassing	
the	 frontiers	 of	 medical	 knowledge.”	 See:	
Mirko	Dražen	Grmek,	“Historical	Reflections	
on	 Psychiatric	 Clinical	 Entities”,	 in:	 Joseph	
Agassi	 (ed.),	 Psychiatric Diagnosis,	 Balban	




phy	of	Life”,	 in:	Carl	G.	Jung,	The Practice 
of Psychotherapy. Essays on the Psychology 







S.	Freud,	Gesammelte Werke – Band XI,	pp.	
9–10.	 It	 is	 apparent	 that,	 at	 some	 point	 in	
his	 medical	 career,	 Freud	 began	 to	 rely	 ex-
clusively	 on	 conversation.	 Prior	 to	 this,	 he	
treated	 patients	 through	 hypnosis.	 Hypnosis	
places	 patients	 in	 a	 trance-like,	 unconscious	
state	 in	 which	 they	 are	 able	 to	 gain	 access	
to	 traumatic	 experiences	 and	 abreact	 them	
in	 a	 hysterical	 attack.	 Historically,	 this	 kind	
of	 psychiatric	 treatment	procedure	 is	 tied	 to	
Franz	Anton	Mesmer	(1734–1815).	In	Freud’s	
An Autobiographical Study,	he	claims	that	the	
results	of	 this	 type	of	 treatment	were	key	 to	
the	creation	of	psychoanalysis.	Cf.	S.	Freud,	
Gesammelte Werke – Band XIV,	 pp.	 43–54;	
Henri	 F.	 Ellenberger,	 The Discovery of the 













and	 imperceptible.	 It	was	along	 these	 lines	 that	Freud	pointed	out	 in	his	A 



































Husserl	 continued	 along	 the	 line	 of	 Dilthey	 and	 created	 the	 psychological	
process	of	 eidetic	 reduction,	which	 consists	of	 the	 exclusion	or	bracketing	
(Einklammerung)	of	a	natural	characteristic,	resulting	in	the	establishment	of	
transcendental	awareness	 through	which	man	can	directly	discover	essence	





























A	mentally	 ill	 individual	was	 considered,	 in	
the	Cartesian	spirit	of	the	neurologists	of	the	





of	 these	 same	 empirical	 teachings,	 refused	
to	reduce	 the	causes	of	mental	 illness	 to	 the	
body,	 such	 as	Thomas	Arnold	 (1795–1842).	
This	 non-material	 approach	 to	 mental	 ill-
ness	 during	 the	 Enlightenment	 shaped	 the	
medical	 theory	on	 the	basis	 of	which	moral	
therapy	was	established.	The	most	instrumen-
tal	 figure	 in	moral	 therapy	was	French	doc-
tor	Philippe	Pinel	(1745–1826).	Materialistic	
and	 non-materialistic	 approaches	 to	 mental	
illness	developed	 in	parallel.	 In	Germany,	J.	




was	 Wilhelm	 Griesinger,	 who,	 according	 to	
Karl	 Jaspers,	 was	 the	 true	 founder	 of	 mod-
ern	psychiatry.	We	can	thus	consider	modern	
psychiatry	 the	 successor	 to	 the	 materialisti-
cally-oriented	 medical	 approach	 to	 mental	
illness,	 which	 was	 developed	 at	 universities	
and	in	clinical	brain	anatomy	laboratories.	In	
General Psychopathology,	his	greatest	work,	
Jaspers	 claims	 multiple	 times	 that	 modern	




undergo	 psychoanalytical	 training,	 and	 that	
psychiatry	 occasionally	 accommodates	 to	
existential	 philosophy,	 modern	 psychiatry’s	
determinant	is	the	physiology	of	the	nervous	
system.	Cf.	Karl	Jaspers,	Allgemeine Psycho-
pathologie,	 Springer,	 Berlin	 1946,	 p.	 706;	
Roy	Porter,	Madness: A Brief History,	Oxford	
University	Press,	Oxford	2003,	pp.	123–156;	
Edwin	R.	Wallace,	John	Gach	(ed.),	History 
of Psychiatry and Medical Psychology. With 
an Epilogue on Psychiatry and the Mind-
Body Relation,	Springer,	New	York	2008.
30
Eduard	 Spranger	 claims	 that	 Freud	 follows	




des Jugendalters,	 Quelle	 und	 Meyer,	 Leip-
zig	 1925,	 p.	 130.	 Freud’s	 humanism	 is	 per-
haps	best	expressed	in	his	work	entitled	Eine 











There	 is	 no	 sufficient	 English	 translation	 of	
the	German	word	Geisteswissenschaft.	Most	




Wilhelm	 Dilthey,	 “Ideen	 über	 eine	 besch-
reibende	 und	 zergliedernde	 Psychologie”,	




Edmund	 Husserl,	 Gesammelte Werke	 (Hus-
serliana),	 Band	 III/1:	 Ideen zu einer reinen 
Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen 
Philosophie.	 Erstes	 Buch:	 Allgemeine Ein-
führungin die reine Phänomenologie.	 Neu	
herausgegeben	 von	 Karl	 Schuhmann.	 1.	
Halbband.	 Text	 der	 1–3,	Auflage,	 Martinus	
Nijhoff,	Den	Haag	1976.
35










often	approach	each	other,	 resulting	 in	various	 forms	of	modern	psycholo-



























“Freud’s	psychoanalysis,	 in	fact,	 initially	developed	as	a	method	of	 treatment	(Behandlungs-
methode),	 as	 psychotherapy,	 and	 it	 thus	 bears	 a	 certain	 one-sidedness	 that	 might	 have	 been	








































philosophers	attempted	 to	overcome	with	spiritual	exercises,	but	 rather	 the	
36
Wilhelm	 Windelband,	 “History	 and	 Natu-





in:	C.	G.	Jung,	The Practice of Psychotherapy,	
pp.	89–92.
38
Lewis	 R.	 Wolberg,	 The technique of psy-
chotherapy,	 Grune	 and	 Stratton,	 New	 York	
2013.
39














therapy.	 For	 a	 conversation	 between	 Martin	
Buber	 and	Carl	Rogers	 on	 this	 subject,	 see:	
Judith	 Buber	Agassi	 (ed.),	 Martin Buber on 




Along	 these	 lines,	 Miller,	 Duncan,	 and	
Hubble	claim	the	following:	“When	the	prac-
tice	of	psychotherapy	is	guided	by	a	unifying	






the	 right	 intervention	 or	 practicing	 the	 right	
brand	 of	 therapy	 and	 spend	 more	 time	 do-
ing	what	they	do	best:	understanding,	listen-
ing	 building	 relationships,	 and	 encouraging	
clients	 to	 find	ways	 to	help	 themselves	 (…)	
Whatever	model	is	employed,	however,	most	









nal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology	
61	 (4/1993),	 pp.	 561–573.	 doi:	 https://doi.
org/10.1037//0022-006x.61.4.561.
43










therapy,	On Becoming a Person,	the	psychotherapist	realises	the	compassion	
required	for	psychotherapy	if	he	succeeds	in	appropriately	directing	himself	
towards	 the	patient.	 If	 the	psychotherapist	 is	appropriately	directed	 towards	
the	patient,	he	visibly	displays	 that	he	honestly	feels	how	terrifying	 the	pa-
tient’s	world	 is.	The	psychotherapist	at	 this	point	 readily	wishes	 to	 feel	 the	
patient’s	feelings.	The	more	compassionate	the	psychotherapist	 is,	 the	more	
the	patient	trusts	the	psychotherapist	with	each	passing	moment.	The	patient	












“It	 involves	 the	 courage	 to	 be.	 It	 means	 launching	 oneself	 fully	 into	 the	 stream	 of	 life.	Yet	
the	deeply	exciting	thing	about	human	beings	is	that	when	the	individual	is	inwardly	free,	he	
chooses	as	the	good	life	this	process	of	becoming.”45


























































mostly	 a	 masochistic	 enjoyment	 of	 the	 mis-
ery.”	 See:	 Frederick	 Perls, Ralph	 F.	 Heffer-
line,	Paul	Goodman,	Gestalt Therapy. Excite-
ment and Growth in the Human Personality,	
Souvenir	Press,	London	2013,	pp.	154–155.
45
F.	Carl	R.	Rogers,	On Becoming a Person. A 
Therapist’s View of Psychotherapy,	 Consta-
ble,	London	2004,	p.	196.
46
Cf.	 Chris	 Mace,	 “Therapeutic	 questioning	
and	Socratic	dialogue”,	in:	Chris	Mace	(ed.),	
Heart & Soul,	pp.	13–29;	P.	Hadot,	Philoso-
phy as a Way of Life,	pp.	147–179.
47
It	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 that,	 more	 than	 two	
thousand	 years	 before	 Freud,	 Plato	 claimed	





that	 beast	 was	 tied	 with	 the	 mental	 illness	
that	 tested	 man	 with	 shamelessness,	 under	













that	 between	 Descartes	 and	 Elizabeth	 Char-




sidered	 ethics	 the	 final	 and	 highest	 level	 of	
wisdom,	 and	 he	 considered	 ethics	 to	 be	 the	
practical	psychology	he	outlined	in	Discourse 
de la méthode (Discourse on Method) and	
developed	 more	 thoroughly	 in	 Les passions 
de l’amé (Passions of the Soul).	The	princess	





provisional	 moral,	 by	 creating	 an	 intimate	
dialogue	 in	 which	 he	 expressed	 understand-












not	 be	 illnesses	 that	 can	 completely	 remove	
oneself	 of	 their	 reason,	 and	 weaken	 one	 to	
the	extent	that	they	become	prone	to	give	into	
their	 passions	 against	 their	 will.	 Descartes,	
on	the	other	hand,	always	patiently	answered	
that	no	one	lacks	reason	to	the	extent	as	to	be	
unable	 to	 seek	 happiness	 only	 in	 what	 they	
are	 able	 to	 control.	 Cf.	 Charles	Adam,	 Paul	
Tannery	 (ed.), Œeuvres de Descartes,	 I−XI,	
Vrin	–	C.N.R.S.,	Paris	1964–1976).	Medicina 
animi	represented	the	highest	level	of	wisdom	
to	 other	 modern	 philosophers	 as	 well,	 such	
as	 Spinoza	 and	 Leibniz.	 Cf.	Walther	 Riese,	
“Descartes	as	a	Psychotherapist.	The	Use	of	
Rational	Philosophy	in	the	Treatment	of	Dis-
comfort	 and	 Disease”,	 in:	 Medical History	










Susret između filozofije i suvremene psihoterapije
Sažetak
Rad nastoji razotkriti zaboravljenu perspektivu liječenja ljudske duše – jednu koja ne pripada 
povijesti medicine, nego povijesti filozofije, time naglašavajući vezu između filozofije i suvreme-
ne psihoterapije, pri čemu se ispituje i odnos suvremene psihoterapije i psihologije/psihijatrije. 
Slijedi da psihoterapija nije značajno određena znanjem bitno pripadajućem psihologiji ili psihi-
jatriji unatoč tome što psihoterapija uključuje postupke zasnovane na znanstvenoj i teoretskoj 
bazi psihologije. U zaključku, dokazuje se da nije znanje, u suvremenom smislu, to koje djeluje 




Begegnung von Philosophie und moderner Psychotherapie
Zusammenfassung
Die Arbeit versucht, die vergessene Perspektive der Behandlung der menschlichen Seele auf-
zudecken – eine, die nicht der Geschichte der Medizin angehört, sondern der Geschichte der 
Philosophie – indem sie den Zusammenhang zwischen Philosophie und moderner Psychothera-
pie akzentuiert, wobei auch das Verhältnis zwischen moderner Psychotherapie und Psycholo-
gie/Psychiatrie untersucht wird. Daraus folgt, dass die Psychotherapie nicht signifikant durch 
das Wissen bestimmt wird, das wesenhaft zur Psychologie oder Psychiatrie gehört, obgleich die 
Psychotherapie Verfahren einbezieht, die auf der wissenschaftlichen und theoretischen Basis 
der Psychologie fußen. Schlussfolgernd wird bewiesen, dass das Wissen im modernen Sinne 
nicht das ist, was als Determinante für Psychotherapie fungiert, sondern es eine Form von 




Rencontre entre la philosophie et la psychothérapie contemporaine
Résumé
Ce travail s’attache à révéler la perspective oubliée du soin de l’âme humaine – perspective qui 
n’appartient pas à l’histoire de la médecine mais à l’histoire de la philosophie, mettant ainsi 
l’accent sur le lien entre la philosophie et la psychothérapie contemporaine, et interrogeant par 
là également le rapport entre la psychothérapie contemporaine et la psychologie/psychiatrie. Il 
s’ensuit que la psychothérapie, même si elle inclut des procédés fondés sur une base scientifique 
et théorique de la psychologie, n’est pas déterminée de manière significative par une connais-
sance qui appartient essentiellement à la psychologie ou à la psychiatrie. En conclusion, il 
est démontré que ce n’est pas la connaissance, dans son sens contemporain, qui joue un rôle 




Commentary,	 Brill,	 Leiden	 –	 Boston	 2011,	
pp.	 265–281;	Hubertus	Busche,	 “Die	 innere	
Logik	der	Liebe	in	Leibnizens	Elementa juris 
Naturalis”,	 Studia Leibnitiana	 23	 (2/1991),	
pp.	170–184.
